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The price indexation of Social Security bene￿t payments has emerged in recent years as
a ￿ ashpoint of debate in the United States. I characterize the direct e⁄ects that changes in
that price index would have on retirees who di⁄er in their initial wealth at retirement and
mortality rates after retirement. I propose a simple but ￿ exible theoretical framework that
converts bene￿ts reform ￿rst into changes to retirees￿consumption paths and then into a net
e⁄ect on social welfare. I calibrate that framework using recently-produced data on Social
Security bene￿ciaries by lifetime income decile and both existing and new survey evidence on
the normative priorities Americans have for Social Security. The results suggest that the value
retirees place on protection against longevity risk is an important caveat to the widespread
enthusiasm for a switch to a slower-growing price index such as the chained CPI-U.
Introduction
The indexation of Social Security bene￿t payments may seem like an issue about which only an
economist could get excited, but it has emerged in recent years as a ￿ ashpoint of debate in the
United States. In his 2014 budget, President Obama proposed changing the price index with which
retiree bene￿ts are adjusted for in￿ ation. In brief, the change was expected to lower the growth
rate of bene￿ts for all retirees, though at advanced ages that change would have been o⁄set by
progressive "bene￿t enhancements." Because it was not tied to an increase in the starting level of
those bene￿ts, the President￿ s proposal was expected to reduce the total present value of bene￿ts.
The President￿ s proposal was explicitly intended to appeal to Congressional Republicans eager to
reduce future spending on Social Security, but it was deeply unpopular with many of his fellow
Democrats1. When negotiations on more general ￿scal policy challenges yielded little progress over
the subsequent year, the President removed the proposal from his 2015 budget. His spokesperson
￿This paper was prepared for the Fall 2014 BPEA conference. Thanks to the editors, David Romer and Justin
Wolfers, as well as to my discussants, Martin Feldstein and Aleh Tsyvinski, and the many participants in that
conference for helpful comments and discussions. Thanks to Darren A. Rippy at the BLS for sharing the data on
CPI-E. The author can be contacted at 277 Morgan Hall, Harvard Business School; mweinzierl@hbs.edu.
1The indexing change was intended to cover tax brackets, as well, and the President￿ s proposal was thereby
intended to be a net positive contributor to the government budget.
1made clear, however, that changes to indexation were still on the table if included in broader budget
deals.
While the overall ￿scal implications of bene￿ts-indexing reform have been widely discussed,
this paper￿ s contribution is to explore both the positive and normative aspects of its distributional
consequences across the population of retirees.2 In particular, I study the direct e⁄ects that changes
in bene￿ts-indexing have on retirees who di⁄er in two important ways: initial wealth at retirement
and mortality rates after retirement. I propose a simple but ￿ exible theoretical framework that
converts bene￿ts reform ￿rst into changes to retirees￿consumption paths and then into a net e⁄ect
on social welfare. I use recently-produced data on the net worth, bene￿t levels, and mortality risks
of Social Security bene￿ciaries by lifetime income decile to provide quantitative results. Finally,
I introduce survey evidence on the priorities Americans have for Social Security, a ￿rst step in
pinning down the normative implications of these e⁄ects of indexing reform. The speci￿c questions
I use in the survey take a novel form that may be useful for estimating normative preferences across
a wide range of policy issues.
In brief, I ￿nd that a useful metaphor for thinking about the direct e⁄ects of indexation on
heterogeneous retirees is a playground seesaw, where two facts about retired households in the
United States push down on opposite ends.
Pushing down on the left end of the seesaw (i.e., toward an increasing path of real bene￿ts) is
the large majority of Social Security bene￿ciaries who worry about outliving their private assets
and having to rely nearly exclusively on those bene￿ts to fund expenditure late in life. In fact, a
core purpose￿ and achievement￿ of Social Security is to prevent the elderly from falling into poverty
as they age (see Gary V. Englehardt and Jonathan Gruber, 2004). As has long been understood,
for instance in Feldstein (1987), bene￿ts that rise in real terms over retirement and are therefore
backloaded later in life will provide valuable protection against longevity risk for retirees with
positive private wealth (throughout this paper, I assume that private annuitization of wealth outside
of DB pensions is unavailable). A faster-growing price index will therefore generate welfare gains
through its e⁄ects on these households.
Pushing down on the other end of the metaphorical seesaw (i.e, toward a decreasing path of
real bene￿ts) sit the poorest retiree households, who also have the highest mortality rates (see
James E. Duggan, Robert Gillingham, and John S. Greenlees, 2006). Most directly, the poorest
retirees sit on this end because, with little wealth at the start of retirement, they bene￿t less from
Social Security￿ s e⁄ective annuitization. A more subtle reason is that a faster-growing price index
that backloads the present value of bene￿ts has the e⁄ect of redistributing, through an actuarially
unfair adjustment, some of the total value of bene￿ts away from poorer retirees when mortality is
inversely related to income. To the extent that these retirees are the ones who most need support
from Social Security, a faster-growing price index thereby generates welfare losses.
2The e⁄ects of moving to a slower-growing price index, such as the chained CPI-U, on the paths of bene￿ts across
retirees have been analyzed by a number of researchers. See CRFB (2013) and Anya Olsen (2008), for example.
These prior analyses did not translate the e⁄ects on bene￿ts into implications for consumption or welfare, and they
did not compare alternative indexing schemes￿ the two main contributions of this paper.
2In other words, heterogeneity across retiree households means that any given reform to bene￿ts-
indexing generates e⁄ects with exactly opposite welfare implications. In this way, bene￿ts-indexing
policy inevitably has distributional consequences and, as we will see when considering the proposal
by President Obama, may even be used to pursue distributional goals.
It is important to emphasize from the start that this paper focuses on the direct e⁄ects of
bene￿ts-indexing reform on retirees, abstracting from a number of general equilibrium e⁄ects and
other factors that matter for the optimal path of bene￿ts and that, therefore, ought to be part of a
comprehensive evaluation of indexing reform.3 Most prominently, changing the path of bene￿ts may
a⁄ect individuals￿labor e⁄ort and saving decisions during their working lives, but my calculations
hold ￿xed households￿behavior prior to retirement. Related, I do not consider the implications of
bene￿ts-indexing reform for the accumulation of the economy￿ s capital stock, and I abstract from
the controversial possibility that bene￿ts paid earlier will yield gains to households who can achieve
a higher rate of return in the private investment market than they obtain from the natural rate of
return of a pay-as-you-go Social Security system (see Feldstein 1987, 1990). Finally, technological
change, especially in the context of medical care for the elderly, may a⁄ect the optimal response of
policy to an increase in real bene￿ts and therefore matter for the choice of indexing.4 This paper￿ s
omission of these factors is not meant to imply that they can be ignored. Instead, I omit them to
better focus on one piece of that broader question.
This paper also abstracts from several complications speci￿c to the Social Security system
that may matter for the results but that would make the analysis and intuition for the results
substantially less straightforward. In particular, I do not model spouses￿joint decisions about
bene￿ts or surviving spouses￿decisions about bene￿ts options, instead treating the household as
the unit of analysis; I do not allow for early or late retirement, instead having all households
retire at the same age; and I do not include the disability bene￿ts portion of Social Security in the
analysis. Microsimulation models that capture much of the complexity of the actual Social Security
system, for instance the MINT model as described in Smith and Favreault (2013), may be useful
for including these features in future analyses.
Which side of the seesaw carries more weight? I show that the answer depends on both positive
factors about which we have some good existing evidence and normative factors about which we
have very little. For the positive factors, I show that a large majority of retirees are likely to sit on
the left end of the seesaw, that is, favor a steeper path of bene￿ts that e⁄ectively annuitizes more
of a given retiree￿ s total wealth. Moreover, the simulations below suggest that the gains to the
poor from frontloading bene￿ts are much smaller, in consumption or individual utility terms, than
3In principle, as suggested to me by Martin Feldstein, the design of the optimal path of bene￿ts and the identi-
￿cation of an ideal price index are separate tasks. If we believe the path of real bene￿ts has been chosen optimally
in current policy, such a separation is natural. In this paper, I explore the question of how proposed price indexes
a⁄ect the path of real bene￿ts and, therefore, retirees and social welfare.
4Suppose that advances in medical care for the elderly allowed them to purchase a higher quality of life at a lower
real cost, such as through the introduction of a new product. Their real bene￿ts would rise in this case, but so too
would their ability to generate extra welfare with additional resources. In that case, it may be important to target
bene￿ts toward households with high marginal utilities of consumption, not low values of real bene￿ts.
3the gains to the majority of retirees from backloading bene￿ts. These positive results suggest that
the direct e⁄ects on retirees of frontloading bene￿ts, as in a switch to the chained CPI, are likely
to generate a net loss of welfare unless society puts a strong normative priority on the poorest,
shortest-lived retirees relative to the rest of the population and, in particular, relative to poor and
middle-class retirees who outlive their life expectancy at retirement. In other words, the results of
this paper suggest that the value retirees place on protection against longevity risk is an important
caveat to the widespread enthusiasm for a switch to a slower-growing price index such as the chained
CPI-U.
To explore the normative aspects of this question, I consider two classic normative criteria and
generate novel opinion survey evidence on the relevant preferences of Americans. The two classic
criteria would endorse opposite reform proposals as simulated here: that is, the utilitarian criterion
would endorse backloading while the Rawlsian would endorse frontloading. Survey respondents put
equal value on increasing bene￿ts to poor retirees who die young and poor retirees who outlive their
life expectancies, and they put substantially less value￿ perhaps even negligible value￿ on increasing
the bene￿ts of average retirees. These results are inconsistent with either a utilitarian or Rawlsian
criterion on its own, but applying them to the simulated reform results suggests that backloading
of bene￿ts is likely to generate net welfare gains, at least in terms of its direct e⁄ects on retirees,
as is the case under the standard utilitarian criterion.
From a policymaking perspective, the net positive welfare implications of the direct e⁄ects on
retirees of moving to a faster-growing price index might be expected to translate into political
support for such a reform, but two political realities make that support less likely: namely, public
opposition to bene￿t reductions, and pressure from some policymakers to lower total Social Se-
curity spending.5 To see why, note that such a reform automatically means a decrease in initial
bene￿ts for retirees (if total spending is held ￿xed) or an increase in total spending (if initial ben-
e￿ts are held ￿xed). Taking those political realities into account, the results of this paper shed
some light on the speci￿c reform President Obama proposed in his 2014 budget. That proposal,
which was designed to reduce total spending by maintaining initial bene￿t levels but slowing their
growth rate, used "bene￿t enhancements" at advanced ages to protect some of the e⁄ective an-
nuitization that frontloading would otherwise have sacri￿ced. As I show below, the progressive
design of those bene￿t enhancements meant that they would provide this protection largely to
lower-income households. The President￿ s proposed reform would thus simultaneously achieve the
positive e⁄ects of frontloading on the poorest, shortest-lived retirees and the positive e⁄ects of
backloading on the poorest, longest-lived retirees, and it would bring a substantial net welfare
gain under the utilitarian, Rawlsian, or survey-based normative criterion.6 Of course, that reform
would generate losses as well, reducing the well-being of the higher-income half of the retiree popu-
lation and￿ therefore￿ potentially having disincentive e⁄ects that would reduce its appeal in a more
5Of course, the indirect e⁄ects of reform not included in this paper￿ s analysis, such as the e⁄ects on private saving
and capital accumulation, may also explain resistance to reform.
6Note that the frontloaded element of the proposal adds to its appeal under the Rawlsian criterion, but not under
the utilitarian or survey-based criteria.
4comprehensive analysis. The President￿ s proposal thus illustrates the inherent connection between
bene￿ts-indexing policy and the redistributional role of Social Security.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews how Social Security uses indexing today,
lays out the seesaw metaphor described above, and brie￿ y summarizes the empirical literature
behind the factors at each end. Section 2 presents a simple model that allows us to analyze these
direct e⁄ects on retiree households with a small set of positive and normative parameters. Section
3 simulates a version of that model using U.S. data, and it considers three prominent indexing
reform proposals: the chained CPI-U, the CPI-E (an experimental series calculated by the BLS
"using households whose reference person or spouse is 62 years of age or older"), and the chained
CPI-U augmented with late-in-life "bene￿t enhancements" as proposed by President Obama in
2014. Section 4 presents novel, but far from de￿nitive, opinion survey evidence on the normative
components of the model and uses that evidence as well as conventional normative criteria to
provide suggestive welfare evaluations of the direct e⁄ects of the three policy options. Section
5 extends the analysis to include several aspects omitted from the baseline case, and Section 6
concludes.
1 Background and Key Considerations
The current Social Security system uses indexing￿ that is, adjusting nominal values over time￿ in
three ways. First, it scales the income earned during a bene￿ciary￿ s working years into current
dollars when calculating the value at retirement of his total accumulated Social Security earnings.
Second, it indexes the bracket points of the progressive function that converts that scaled lifetime
earnings into a monthly bene￿t. Third, it indexes bene￿ts upon retirement. For the ￿rst two
instances of indexing, the current system uses a wage index; for the third it uses the CPI-W, the
consumer price index for urban wage earners.
These three instances of indexing can be seen as serving di⁄erent purposes. The ￿rst, which I
will call earnings-indexing, is most naturally seen as trying to capture the natural rate of return of
the pay-as-you-go (or "unfunded") Social Security system, which is closely related to the growth
rate of nominal wages.7 The second, which I will call brackets-indexing, tries to preserve the desired
progressivity (across lifetime earnings levels) of the system despite changes in the wage distribution
and nominal wages. The third, which I will call bene￿ts-indexing, tries to protect the real value of
retirees￿bene￿ts over time, though as emphasized throughout this paper it also has implications for
the e⁄ective progressivity of the system due to di⁄erences in mortality by lifetime income levels. It
is bene￿ts-indexing that has been the focus of public debate, and it will be my focus in this paper
7Earnings-indexing could, in principle, serve many purposes. Because the lifecycle path of earnings varies sys-
tematically with the value of lifetime earnings, the choice of indexing will tend to favor some earners over others.
One could try to use that choice, therefore, as a new optimal tax instrument that would relax the classic e¢ ciency-
equality tradeo⁄. Similarly, one might try to take advantage of the e⁄ect that expected earnings-indexing has on the
extent to which workers view the payroll tax as a tax, rather than as a form of saving. These are purposes that can
be more directly pursued by adjusting the history-dependent redistributive elements of Social Security, such as the
replacement rates in each income bracket.
5as well.8
1.1 Budget-neutral bene￿ts-indexing
This paper￿ s baseline analysis focuses on budget-neutral bene￿ts-indexing reforms. By "budget-
neutral" I mean that the expected present value of bene￿ts (across all individuals in an age cohort)
is una⁄ected by the way in which bene￿ts are indexed. Therefore, in the analysis below in which
I consider a shift to an index that causes a steeper rise in bene￿ts over time, I adjust (down)
the starting value of bene￿ts for all bene￿ciaries in the cohort by the factor required to keep the
expected present value of total bene￿ts the same. The assumption of budget neutrality is not
necessary, but it allows us to focus on the direct e⁄ects of the time path of bene￿ts rather than
their level. As I show in Section 5, reforms that are not budget neutral can be analyzed using this
paper￿ s approach as well, and the main lessons are una⁄ected.
A simple but useful observation about changes to budget-neutral bene￿ts-indexing is that their
e⁄ects on bene￿t levels are highly concentrated toward the beginning and end of retirement, as
illustrated in the following ￿gure.
8There appears to be little interest in reform to the other two uses of indexing. Even the Bowles-Simpson proposal
(White House 2010), which suggests changing the bracket points to increase progressivity, does not change the
methods of earnings-indexing or brackets-indexing. This is somewhat unfortunate, in that changes to the method of
earnings-indexing hold substantial promise for more closely aligning the current system with its true "natural" rate
of return. In particular, earnings-indexing could include changes to projected bene￿ciary-worker (dependency) ratios
and aggregate life expectancies. Bracket-indexing would be a simple way of implementing a limited version of the
inequality adjustments suggested by, for example, Robert Shiller (2003).
6Figure 1: Bene￿ts received (in $2005) under three paths with the same
expected present value for a male, 65-year-old retiree with median
household earnings and average mortality rates.
To produce Figure 1, I start with the initial annual Social Security bene￿t for the median retired
household from the ￿fth decile of household lifetime earnings, as calculated in John Karl Scholz,
Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun (2006) and shown in real (2005) dollars. I assume the
"Status Quo" policy would provide a constant stream of real bene￿ts at this level (in Section 5 I
show that alternatives to this assumption do not change the lessons of the baseline analysis). As
alternatives to a constant real bene￿t, I consider two paths : a "Frontloaded" path in which real
bene￿ts grow at an annual rate of -0.27 percentage points, and a "Backloaded" path in which they
grow at +0.37 percentage points. These alternatives correspond to two prominent proposals for
bene￿ts-indexing reform: namely the use of the chained CPI-U and the CPI-E indexes calculated
by the BLS. Using average mortality rates from the Social Security Administration and an annual
discount factor of 0.96, I adjust initial bene￿ts under these two alternatives to ensure that the
expected present value total cost of each path is the same as for the Status Quo.
Figure 1 makes clear the roots of the seesaw metaphor: the sizeable di⁄erences in bene￿ts early
and late in retirement across bene￿t paths. Retirees who value Social Security￿ s insurance against
longevity risk, and especially those who come to rely on Social Security bene￿ts because they outlive
their private savings, will prefer the backloaded bene￿ts path. Retirees with little private wealth
or high mortality risks, and especially those who do not survive to advanced ages, will prefer the
frontloaded path. I now turn to a brief discussion of the existing literature on these two competing
7features in the retired population in the United States.
1.2 Evidence on variation in private retirement savings
An extensive literature has examined whether retirees enter retirement with su¢ cient assets to
sustain their economic well-being. In general, the results have drawn a qualitative distinction
between the status of the large majority of the Social Security population and approximately the
bottom quintile of retirees. Reassuringly, most retirees appear to reach retirement with su¢ cient
assets (both Social Security and non-Social Security) to smooth shocks, supplement Social Security
bene￿ts, and maintain what a rational life-cycle consumer with their lifetime earnings history would
plan as an optimal path of expenditures. The bottom quintile, in contrast, enter retirement (or
soon ￿nd themselves) almost entirely dependent upon Social Security bene￿ts and other transfers.
A number of studies have obtained such a result, and some have drawn policy implications from it.
I brie￿ y review several of them here, though of course the literature is too large to do it full justice
in such a short discussion.
Rudolph G. Penner and Karen E. Smith (2010) summarize the ￿ndings of Smith, Mauricio
Soto, and Penner (2009), who use Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data from 1998 through
2006 to study the assets held by retirees, including the expected present value of their pension and
Social Security bene￿ts. They conclude: "The net worth of those in the top quintile of the income
distribution increased until age 85 (￿gure 1). For those in the three middle quintiles, net worth
began declining after age 70, but only very slowly. Evidently, the vast majority in this portion
of the income distribution will die with a signi￿cant amount of assets. Few older households,
including those with little income, used home equity to ￿nance retirement consumption. The
bottom income quintile never accumulated much wealth and spent their assets quickly, leaving
them dependent on Social Security and whatever DB pensions they had earned...Our results are
reassuring for households in the top 80 percent of the income distribution, but the data indicate
that the lowest income quintile quickly becomes almost wholly dependent on Social Security after
retirement....Reformers must be sensitive to the heavy dependence on Social Security in the lowest
part of the income distribution."
Consistent with these ￿ndings, David A. Love, Michael G. Palumbo, and Paul A. Smith (2009)
note that "It is reasonably well known that retirees in the bottom quintile of the income distribution
(conditional on their age and marital status) rely almost exclusively on DB pension bene￿ts, Social
Security bene￿ts, and other government transfers to ￿nance spending." Barbara A. Butrica, Joshua
H. Goldwyn, and Richard W. Johnson (2005) also use HRS data and ￿nd that "Individuals in the
lowest income quintile consume between 99 and 107 percent of their after-tax income plus annuitized
assets." Michael D. Hurd and Susann Rohwedder (2008) focus on preparedness for retirement across
levels of educational attainment and estimate that 17 percent of married people and 36 percent of
singles are not adequately prepared for retirement (meaning that they are likely to exhaust their
wealth before death).
Finally, Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006), hereafter SSK, use HRS data and a dynamic
8lifecycle optimization model and show that only a small minority of individuals are failing to save
adequately to sustain desired consumption paths. While doing so, they ￿nd that Social Security
wealth dominates for at least the bottom lifetime-income decile, arguably the bottom three deciles,
of retirees.9 As discussed below, I will rely on these authors￿research for estimates of retiree wealth
and Social Security bene￿ts by income group.
1.3 Evidence on the relation between income and mortality
It has become a staple of commentary on the ￿scal health of Social Security that mortality dif-
ferences across income groups matter for the true impact of a range of proposed reforms, such as
to the full retirement age (see Paul Krugman 2012, for example). While the literature quantifying
these mortality di⁄erences is less developed than that on wealth, I draw heavily on a few relatively
recent contributions.
Gopi Shah Goda, John B. Shoven, and Sita Nataraj Slavov (2009) use mortality estimates for
the top and bottom halves of the earnings distribution to show the dramatic result that "Under
the assumption of constant mortality across lifetime income subgroups, the Social Security system
is progressive regardless of the measure shown. However, a good deal of the progressivity is undone
or even reversed when di⁄erential mortality is taken into account. The results are similar for
both stylized earners at di⁄erent points of the earnings distribution and actual workers￿earnings
histories." They also o⁄er this speculation: "Rather than analyzing the mortality di⁄erences between
those in the top and bottom halves of the lifetime earnings distributions, we would have liked to
have the information by lifetime income decile so that we could examine the mortality experience
of the genuinely poor vs. those at other parts of the distribution. It seems likely that the extent of
mortality inequality is even greater than re￿ ected in the top half/bottom half analysis." In fact, it
appears that variation in mortality does widen at the extremes of the income distribution. Duggan
et al. (2007) use administrative Social Security data to show a consistently positive relationship
between average age of death and lifetime earnings deciles.
Related to Goda et al.￿ s suggestion that more disaggregated estimates would yield additional
insights, Hilary Waldron (2007) uses Social Security Administration data to characterize life ex-
pectancy for men by income quartile at 5-year increments from age 60 to age 85. A complementary
data source is Bosworth and Burke (2014), who use the HRS to calculate life expectancy at age 55
for men and women as well as relative mortality rates for men and women aged 50-74 and 75+ by
income quintile. Both of these sources show that retirees in approximately the bottom quarter (for
example) of the lifetime earnings distribution have life expectancies 15 to 20 percent less than those
in the top quarter prior to retirement. These gaps are larger than those between the second and
third quarters of the income distribution, and Waldron￿ s estimates suggest they are not narrowing
over time. I explain in Section 3 how I use these results.
9SSK ￿nd that the underaccumulation of wealth is driven not by lifetime income per se but by being single rather
than married, as single retirees have systematically lower incomes. I do not distinguish between single and married
households in this analysis.
92 A Partial Reform approach to optimal bene￿ts-indexing
In this section I lay out a simple formal structure through which to model how bene￿ts-indexing
reforms turn into changes in the consumption paths of retirees and how these consumption changes
can be aggregated into a measure of social welfare.10 As noted in the Introduction, this analysis
focuses on the direct e⁄ects of bene￿ts-indexing reform on retirees in the context of heterogeneity
in initial wealth and mortality risks, setting aside a number of other factors that matter for a
more general approach to the topic of optimal bene￿ts-indexing. In particular, I abstract from any
distortionary e⁄ects that changes to the method of Social Security bene￿ts-indexing may have on
labor supply or saving decisions of households during their working lives.
In the model, there are I types of Social Security bene￿ciaries, indexed by i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig and
equally prevalent at the time of retirement, t = 1. Type indicates the level of lifetime income yi,
the level of non-annuitized wealth Ai;1 available at t = 1, and age-speci￿c mortality risks mi;t.
A more general model would not impose a one-to-one link between net wealth, mortality risk,
and lifetime income, but the theoretical and (especially) empirical challenges to the analysis are
substantially reduced with this assumption. The probability of individual i being alive at age t is Yt
￿=1 (1 ￿ mi;￿). As the use of private annuities in the United States is quite limited (see Brown
et al, 2001), I assume annuitization of Ai is unavailable or unappealingly costly.
Once reaching retirement, each bene￿ciary receives streams of real-valued Social Security bene-
￿ts denoted fBi;tgi;t and (possibly zero) DB pension bene￿ts denoted fPi;tg for type i at age t (note
that all quantities in this paper￿ s analysis are real, not nominal, unless otherwise noted). In the





all ages s; t. A reform to the method of bene￿ts-indexing generates a stream of changes in bene￿ts
that I will denote fdBi;tgi;t. Note that I treat Bi;t as an after-tax bene￿t, implicitly assuming that
reform to bene￿ts-indexing does not change the tax rates on retiree bene￿ts.
Though in principle a reform could take a wide range of forms, in this paper we are especially
interested in one class:
Bi;t = ￿B
SQ
i (1 + ￿)














where ￿ is the uniform discount factor in the economy (I consider heterogeneity in ￿ in Section 5).
This class of reforms scales the initial bene￿t level by the factor ￿ ￿ 0 and grows that scaled bene￿t
by the rate ￿ each year, such that the total present value cost of bene￿t payments is the same in
the Status Quo and reform policies. For example, a reform that increased the initial bene￿t level
and then reduced the rate of growth in real bene￿ts would have ￿ > 1 and ￿ < 0:
Individuals solve a standard utility-maximization problem once they reach retirement. They
10I consider a relatively narrow set of reforms that deviate only slightly from the status quo policy, so it is natural
to use this so-called "partial reform" approach of Guesnerie (1977), Feldstein (1976), and more recently Saez and
Stantcheva (2014).
10use their accumulated assets and their streams of Social Security and DB pension bene￿ts to
fund consumption in each period they are alive, and they obtain time-separable utility from that
consumption. Note that there is no uncertainty in the utility they obtain from spending in the
future.11 Utility is zero when not alive, and there is no bequest motive (in Section 5 I show the
results are robust to adding a bequest motive). They are subject to the (real-world) constraint that












subject to a constraint that (non-Social Security) net worth must be non-negative at all points
during retirement:
Ai;t ￿ 0, for all t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg;
where Ai;1 is given and
Ai;t+1 = (Ai;t + Pi;t + Bi;t ￿ ci;t)(1 + r):
where (1 + r) = ￿￿1 is the annual return (net of taxes) that an individual may earn on net wealth.
Note that in this model, were households able to fully annuitize their wealth, they would choose
a constant consumption level throughout retirement. Without such full annuitization, mortality
risk will cause the household￿ s optimal consumption path to decline throughout retirement until
reaching the level of annuity bene￿ts (provided by Social Security and DB pensions, if applicable).
After that point, the household will be dependent on these bene￿ts to fund consumption.
The expected change in social welfare from reform fdBi;tgi;t is evaluated as the weighted sum
of the welfare values of the consumption changes it causes. In particular, social welfare is denoted












where ￿tdci;t=fdBi;tgi;t denotes the present value of the change in consumption by type i in year t
in response to the change in policy, and gi;t is the marginal social welfare value of a present value
unit of consumption for a bene￿ciary of type i in year t.
It is important to note that these gi;t parameters can take essentially any values, though Pareto
e¢ ciency would require them to be nonnegative. This ￿ exibility enables us to use a wide variety
of welfare criteria, including those inferred from public opinion, to evaluate policy reforms. An
alternative formal approach would locate the welfare costs from the low lifetime utility of the
shortest-lived, poorest retirees in their own utility functions, perhaps by having their utility be
a highly concave function of total consumption in retirement or some other version of time non-
11Medical expenditure shocks have been shown by many previous researchers to be important for retirees￿decisions
and welfare. Though not included in this paper, upward shocks to the marginal utility of spending at later ages
would likely increase the appeal of the backloaded bene￿ts streams.
11separability.12 Then, helping those retirees would be a matter of insurance, not redistribution (this
logic is related to the justi￿cation Rawls o⁄ers for the maximin priority). It is far from clear that
individuals have such preferences, however, so I take the approach that granting large weights to
those worst-case outcomes is a normative decision by society, not a feature of individual preferences.
3 Simulated e⁄ects of bene￿ts-indexing reform proposals
To simulate the e⁄ects of bene￿ts-indexing reform, we need to specify functional forms and para-
meter values for the preceding section￿ s model, determine the values of the model￿ s key empirical
inputs, and choose candidate reform policies.
3.1 Functional forms and parameter values









where ￿ = 3 following SSK.13 I follow SSK in setting the annual discount factor ￿ = 0:96 as well,
and I assume that the return to saving (1 + r) = ￿￿1:
3.2 Data on initial wealth, bene￿t levels, and mortality
To determine the key empirical inputs to the model, I use estimates drawn from the existing
literature on Social Security. I divide the population of retiree households into deciles by lifetime
income, so I = 10 and each type i=f1;2;:::;10g corresponds to a lifetime income decile. The use
of ten types is made possible by recent empirical work estimating household wealth, bene￿ts, and
mortality data at that level of disaggregation. Some of that data is not available by gender, so I
treat households as the unit of analysis throughout.
For the initial wealth and bene￿t levels of retirees I rely on SSK, which is a careful and uniquely
detailed source of these data, in that no other source of which I am aware provides both median
overall (non-Social Security) net worth and median (present value) Social Security and DB pension
wealth data by lifetime income decile. This level of detail is especially important for capturing
the right end of the seesaw: for example, data that divides the population into quintiles, or that
groups households by point-in-time income rather than lifetime income, can obscure the di¢ cult
position in which the lowest decile of retirees appear to ￿nd themselves. To infer annual bene￿t
amounts for both Social Security and DB pensions, I use average mortality rates (for men) in the
12I thank Bob Hall for suggesting this discussion.
13This value for ￿ is toward the upper end of typical ranges for this parameter, which measures the degree of risk-
aversion of the individual. Though a high value for ￿ may be appropriate if retirees are generally more risk-averse
than the average person, I have also run the analysis assuming ￿ = 1:5. All qualitative results described in the
baseline case hold there as well, though the size of the welfare gains generated by the Hybrid Progressive Reform are
smaller. Intuitively, with less concave utility from consumption that policy￿ s redistribution is less valuable in terms
of social welfare.
12United States and the same real interest rate r as in SSK to calculate the constant real bene￿t
amounts that yields SSK￿ s reported wealth ￿gures by lifetime earnings decile (in their Table 2). Of
course, SSK￿ s data are not perfectly designed for my purposes. Most obviously, the average age
of their sample is 55.7 years, several years prior to typical retirement age. Ideally, we would have
data at age 62 or 65. While it is possible that the last few years prior to retirement di⁄erentially
a⁄ect retiree households by income decile, a comparison of the SSK data with calculations by Love,
Palumbo, and Smith for (point-in-time) income quintiles suggests that this is not likely to be a
serious concern. A di⁄erent concern is that the SSK data are relatively old, focused on the 1992
HRS wave. Gale, Scholz, and Seshadri (2009) attempt to address this concern and show that their
core ￿ndings are largely una⁄ected by considering later cohorts (though they do not reproduce the
estimates needed for this paper for later waves). Finally, recent work on the progressivity of the
overall OASDI program has noted that, in the words of CBO (2006), "the progressivity of Social
Security is driven mainly by disabled-worker and auxiliary [survivor] bene￿ts.". While this paper
focuses on the retirement portion of bene￿ts, for which SSK￿ s estimates are well-suited, we may be
interested in the implications of indexing reform that applies to disability bene￿ts as well. (Note
that SSK implicitly includes disability bene￿ts after retirement age has been reached, as disability
bene￿ts are automatically converted to retirement bene￿ts at that point).
Table 1 shows the median (non-Social Security) net worth Ai, annualized DB pension bene￿t
Pi;t, annual bene￿t level under the Status Quo Social Security system B
SQ
i , and present value Social
Security wealth, all in 2005 dollars and by household lifetime earnings decile. To be clear, all of
these estimates are from SSK other than B
SQ
i , which is inferred from SSK￿ s Social Security wealth
estimates.
Table 1: Net wealth and initial bene￿ts ($2005)
Lifetime earnings decile, type i Ai Pi;t B
SQ
i SS wealth
1 (lowest) 6,938 0 3,086 36,357
2 35,383 0 4,965 58,499
3 60,336 0 6,813 80,263
4 104,069 1,259 9,122 107,471
5 124,883 2,504 11,180 131,722
6 172,543 3,872 14,016 165,138
7 178,416 4,756 15,717 185,175
8 231,727 6,058 17,831 210,076
9 313,594 8,883 19,273 227,063
10 (highest) 545,321 10,779 23,273 281,206
Standing out from Table 1 are the small initial net wealth holdings Ai of the lowest deciles of the
lifetime-earnings distribution.14
14Though not included in the baseline analysis, in Section 5 I show the robustness of the main results to including in
the simulations a means-tested (by income) transfer payable to all individuals, modeled on the Supplemental Security
13To estimate mortality rates by income decile, I rely on recent work by Bosworth and Burke
(2014), who calculate relative mortality rates by lifetime-income quintiles and gender in the HRS
for the age range 50-74. From the Social Security Administration￿ s current period life table, I
have average mortality rates by age and gender. Combining these data sources, I adjust the
SSA￿ s overall average mortality rates at age 65 by a vector of scalars to approximately match
BB￿ s mortality patterns by income quintiles. BB also report relative mortality rates for the age
range 75+, indicating some convergence of mortality rates across income quintiles as retirees age.
To roughly match this convergence, I calculate mortality rates after age 65 so that each decile￿ s
mortality rate approaches linearly the average gender-speci￿c mortality rate by age 119, the Social
Security Administration life table￿ s terminal age (the results change very little if I assume no such
convergence in relative mortality). The following table shows the resulting one-year mortality rates
for each decile, by gender, at 10-year increments from age 65 through 95.
Table 2: One-year calculated mortality rates (in percent)
Men￿ s age Women￿ s age
Lifetime earnings decile, type i 65 75 85 95 65 75 85 95
1 (lowest) 2.2 4.9 12.3 30.4 1.5 3.6 9.6 25.4
2 2.0 4.6 11.8 29.4 1.4 3.4 9.2 24.6
3 1.9 4.3 11.2 28.4 1.2 3.0 8.4 23.0
4 1.9 4.3 11.2 28.4 1.1 2.9 8.0 22.2
5 1.9 4.3 11.2 28.4 1.1 2.8 7.8 21.8
6 1.6 3.8 10.2 26.4 1.0 2.7 7.6 21.4
7 1.5 3.6 9.6 25.4 1.0 2.7 7.6 21.4
8 1.3 3.3 9.1 24.4 1.0 2.7 7.6 21.4
9 1.2 3.0 8.5 23.5 0.9 2.3 6.8 19.8
10 (highest) 1.1 2.8 8.0 22.5 0.5 1.6 5.2 16.6
Social Security Administration average 1.6 3.8 10.2 26.4 1.0 2.7 7.6 21.4
The calculated mortality rates in Table 2 show the dramatic negative relationship between
lifetime earnings and mortality rates, especially early in retirement. These rates roughly match
existing related estimates along a number of dimensions. For example, shown at the bottom of
Table 2 are the Social Security Administration￿ s o¢ cial average mortality rates for each gender at
each age; these rates match the calculated values for the sixth decile in all cases.
Income program of the United States.
143.3 Reform proposals
I consider three reform proposals, two informed by recent experience with chained CPI-U and the
experimental CPI-E series and a third based on President Obama￿ s proposal that is a hybrid of the
￿rst two. Figure 2 shows historical data for the December values of three price indices, the chained
CPI-U, CPI-E, and the currently-used CPI-W, with each index set equal to 100 in December,
1990. The chained CPI-U was ￿rst reported by the BLS in 2000, while the BLS has backcast the
experimental CPI-E through 1983.
Figure 2: Historical data on three price indices.
The ￿gure makes clear that chained-CPI-U has risen more slowly than CPI-W over the 2000-2013
period, though year-to-year changes are not always smaller. By the end of the fourteen available
years, chained CPI-U is approximately 4 percent lower than CPI-W, for an average annual gap
of ￿0:27 percentage points.15 Over the same period, CPI-E has been nearly identical to CPI-W.
That stands in stark contrast to its more rapid growth from 1983 through 2000, when it exceeded
CPI-W by an average annual rate of 0:37 percentage points.
The ￿rst reform policy￿ "Backloaded Reform"￿ is designed to mimic the CPI-E￿ s behavior in
the 1983-2000 era, having bene￿ts grow at a faster rate than the Status Quo. Speci￿cally, I set
￿ = 0:0037 for Backloaded Reform, implying a steeper path of bene￿ts and a smaller initial bene￿t
than in the Status Quo.
The second reform policy￿ "Frontloaded Reform"￿ is designed to mimic the chained CPI-U￿ s be-
15Thanks to Alan Viard for noting an error in my calculation of this value for ￿ in an earlier draft of the paper.
15havior since its origination, having bene￿ts grow at a slower rate than the Status Quo. Speci￿cally,
I set ￿ = ￿0:0027 for Frontloaded Reform, implying a ￿ atter path of bene￿ts and a larger initial
bene￿t than in the Status Quo. This reform has received much attention in public debates, as the
chained price index is generally seen to address upward bias in the traditional CPI. It may be of
interest to note that The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (White House,
2010), commonly known as the Bowles-Simpson commission, recommended a shift to chained CPI-U
for Social Security bene￿ts-indexing.
The third reform policy￿ "Hybrid Progressive Reform"￿ is designed to match the proposal made
by President Obama. In that proposal, the chained CPI-U would be used to index bene￿ts, but so-
called "bene￿t enhancements" would phase in at age 75 and 95, each eventually raising bene￿ts by
￿ve percent of the average retiree￿ s bene￿t over a ten-year phase-in period. This reform combines
features of the two others, but it also includes a substantial increase in the progressivity of Social
Security bene￿ts. The source of this increase is the use of the average retiree￿ s bene￿t, rather than
each individual retiree￿ s bene￿t, in the calculation of the bene￿t enhancement. As the average
bene￿t is approximately four times greater than the lowest-decile￿ s bene￿t and half as large as the
top decile￿ s (see Table 2), the ￿rst ten-year bene￿t enhancement would e⁄ectively raise bene￿ts by
20 percent for the lowest decile retiree and 2.5 percent for the highest decile retiree. The President￿ s
proposal thereby illustrates how the debate over indexing is closely linked to the broader debate over
progressivity. Related, note that this proposal￿ s redistributive impacts make it more likely to a⁄ect
labor supply during households￿working lives￿ e⁄ects from which this paper abstracts throughout
(see Je⁄rey B. Liebman, Erzo F.P. Luttmer, and David G. Seif, 2009 for evidence on how labor
supply responds to Social Security bene￿ts changes).
Table 3 summarizes these proposals and shows the equilibrium value of ￿ that satis￿es the
government budget constraint when we simulate the economy￿ s response to each policy. Technically,
to obtain these values we set ￿ for each reform policy and have the simulation guess a value for
￿. All individuals maximize their utilities given these parameters and the data on bene￿ts, net
wealth, and mortality. The simulation searches for a value of ￿ that satis￿es the government￿ s
budget constraint as shown in (2):
Table 3: Reform policy parameters
Policy ￿ ￿
Status Quo 0.0000 1.000
Backloaded Reform (CPI-E) 0.0037 0.970
Frontloaded Reform (chained CPI-U) -0.0027 1.022
Hybrid Progressive Reform
(
-0.0027 + bene￿t enhancements
for ages 76-85 and 95+
1.011
Note how the Hybrid Progressive Reform leaves the starting value of bene￿ts closest to, and above,
the Status Quo value, a feature that may be relevant for political feasibility.
163.4 Simulated e⁄ects of reform
Now we turn to the e⁄ects of these reform policies.
I begin by showing the policies￿e⁄ects on real bene￿t payments in Figure 3. The four subplots
of Figure 3 show results for the lowest and second-lowest income deciles, the ￿fth income decile,
and the top income decile. In each subplot, I show the bene￿t paths under the Status Quo and
three reform policies at each age.
























Figure 3: Annual bene￿ts paths under Status Quo (solid line), Backloaded Reform (dashed line),
Frontloaded Reform (dotted line), and Hybrid Progressive Reform (dash-dot line), in thousands
of real 2005 dollars, for four of ten household lifetime-income deciles.
The subplots in Figure 3 for the Frontloaded Reform (dotted lines) and Backloaded Reform (dashed
lines) closely resemble Figure 1, of course. In fact, because we apply the same ￿;￿ pair to all bene￿ts
paths in each reform, the ￿gure shows that the e⁄ects of reform are quite similar across income
deciles. It is also apparent how the Hybrid Progressive Reform (dash-dotted lines) takes on a zigzag
shape that combines the two other reforms￿ providing higher bene￿ts at the start of retirement than
the backloaded reform and higher bene￿ts at the end of retirement than frontloaded reform. In
17fact, compared to the Status Quo (solid lines) policy, it achieves both higher initial bene￿ts and
higher ￿nal bene￿ts for low income retirees, re￿ ecting its substantial redistribution of bene￿ts from
higher to lower deciles.
The e⁄ects on consumption paths chosen by retirees in the model are much more variable across
income deciles. In the next ￿gure, we plot consumption under the Status Quo and these reforms
following the same structure as above:

































Figure 4: Annual consumption paths under Status Quo (solid line), Backloaded Reform (dashed
line), Frontloaded Reform (dotted line), and Hybrid Progressive Reform (dash-dot line), in
thousands of real 2005 dollars, for four of ten household lifetime-income deciles.
Figure 4 shows the pattern of declining consumption until private assets are exhausted, as discussed
in Section 1, which obtains due to the lack of private annuitization. A similar pattern is found in,
for example, Hurd and Rohwedder (2008).
To interpret Figure 4, it may be helpful to focus ￿rst on the comparison of Backloaded Reform
to Frontloaded Reform, postponing a consideration of the Hybrid Progressive Reform until later.
For these two "simple" reforms, two prominent features jump out from Figure 4. First, while a
household￿ s chosen paths of consumption are hardly distinguishable across bene￿ts-indexing meth-
18ods early in retirement, there are sharp divergences when they exhaust their non-Social Security
wealth. Remarkably, all deciles experience a substantially higher median path of consumption in
these later years under the Backloaded Reform than under the Frontloaded Reform, despite the
latter￿ s inability to generate substantial increases in consumption earlier in retirement. Second, the
ages at which households exhaust their private assets and become dependent on Social Security
bene￿ts rise substantially with lifetime income.
One potentially puzzling nuance related to the ￿rst of these features is that for all but the
bottom decile consumption is in fact slightly greater at all ages under the Backloaded reform than
under the Frontloaded reform. The key intuition for this result is that the Frontloaded Reform
provides less insurance against longevity risk than the Backloaded Reform. Therefore, households
choose to consume less of their private assets in order to self-insure against longevity risk, o⁄setting
the mechanical increase in bene￿ts at early ages that the Frontloaded Reform provides.
For the lowest decile households, however, consumption is greater at early ages under the
Frontloaded Reform than under the Backloaded Reform. Two factors explain this exception. First,
these households have little wealth and high mortality rates. Thus, the e⁄ective annuitization
provided by the backloaded path enables only small increases in consumption out of their private
assets early in retirement, in contrast to higher-decile retirees. A second, more subtle reason is
that the frontloading that comes from using a slower-growing price index is not actuarially fair. To
see why, note that the Frontloaded Reform allocates that total value of bene￿ts through a uniform
proportional adjustment to Status Quo bene￿ts. Thus, it causes a redistribution of resources from
low-mortality to high-mortality retirees, increasing the consumption of lower-income retirees. Note
that this factor provides a second reason why consumption paths do not rise for higher-decile
retirees under the Frontloaded Reform.
As for the second prominent feature of Figure 4, consistent with prior research we ￿nd that
most retirees exhaust their private assets only late into retirement, while a substantial share of
lower-income retirees depend on Social Security bene￿ts throughout much of retirement. Overall,
only 18 percent of individuals exhaust their non-Social Security, non-DB assets in this simulation,
also consistent with prior research. For example, Love, Palumbo, and Smith (2008) calculate
"annualized comprehensive wealth," which is the value of a retiree￿ s total resources divided by
his or her remaining life expectancy at any given age. In their research they ￿nd that "in (real)
dollar terms, the median household￿ s...real annualized wealth actually tends to rise with age over
retirement." In our simulations, we ￿nd consistent patterns, with annualized wealth calculated in
this way greater ￿fteen years into retirement than at the start and positive until at least age 90 for
retirees in the third income decile or higher. At the same time, lower income decile retirees exhaust
their non-Social Security wealth much earlier. For the lowest decile, in these simulations non-Social
Security wealth is nearly exhausted ￿fteen years into retirement and is less than the level of annual
bene￿ts only eight years in.
Figure 4 appears to make a strong case in favor of Backloaded Reform relative to Frontloaded
Reform, and that case looks all the stronger if we convert these results on consumption paths
19into changes to expected utility during retirement. All deciles￿ even the lowest￿ prefer Backloaded
Reform to the Status Quo and prefer the Status Quo to Frontloaded Reform in expected utility
terms at retirement.
The seeming dominance of Backloaded Reform is not airtight, however, because it generates
losses for the poorest, shortest-lived retirees relative to Frontloaded Reform or the Status Quo. To
examine this feature of the reforms, we calculate each individual￿ s change in "realized retirement
utility": the change in total utility during retirement for an individual from decile i who lives t years
under each policy. We then convert these changes, which are in units of utility, into consumption
equivalents by calculating the percentage change in the total present value of consumption during
retirement that, when multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption in the last year of life for
a retiree, yields the given change in realized retirement utility. Figure 5 shows the results.




























Figure 5: Di⁄erences in realized retirement utility levels, converted into consumption equivalents,
for four household lifetime-earnings deciles under three reforms from the Status Quo:
Backloaded Reform (dashed line), Frontloaded Reform (dotted line), and Hybrid Progressive
Reform (dash-dot line). Realized retirement utility for type i and age t is the total utility
obtained in retirement for a retired household of income decile i who lives to the age t.
20Figure 5 shows the extent to which the seesaw apparent in bene￿t paths translates into a similar
shape in realized retirement utilities.
For all but the lowest decile of households, the Backloaded Reform generates higher realized
utility than the Frontloaded Reform no matter the age of death, but especially at later ages when
its ability to provide longevity insurance has its greatest value. The same preference holds for
the poorest households who live beyond approximately age 82. In other words, most retirees sit
squarely on the left end of the seesaw when it comes to these direct e⁄ects of bene￿ts-indexing
reform, preferring a steeper path of bene￿ts with a lower starting point. However, the poorest
households who die earlier in retirement prefer Frontloaded Reform over Backloaded Reform, as
shown in the top left subplot of Figure 5. That is, they sit on the right end of the seesaw and prefer
a ￿ atter bene￿t pro￿le.
Now, we turn to a consideration of the Hybrid Progressive Reform in Figures 4 and 5. The
Hybrid Progressive Reform generates very di⁄erent consumption e⁄ects across deciles: while its
path lies below the Status Quo at all ages for the top decile retiree, it exceeds all other paths at all
ages for the bottom decile retiree. These di⁄erences re￿ ect both its combination of the two other
reforms and its extensive redistribution of bene￿ts, as it can achieve wide-ranging improvements for
low-income retirees at the cost of a general decrease in consumption for higher-income retirees. As
would be expected, these implications for consumption translate into gains in realized retirement
utility for every retiree in the bottom two (three, in fact) lifetime income deciles relative to the
Status Quo and losses for every retiree in the top ￿ve deciles.
In the next section, I explore how we might convert these heterogeneous results across retiree
households into net welfare implications.
4 Welfare criteria and net welfare implications of the direct e⁄ects
of reform
As summarized formally in expression (3), in this paper I calculate the net welfare e⁄ects of reform
by multiplying discounted changes in consumption from the Status Quo by two things: the popula-
tion proportion of individuals who survive to enjoy that consumption, and a non-negative welfare
weight gi;t. The weight gi;t measures the value society puts on a marginal increase in consumption
for a household of type i at age t, relative to all other households. Because each reform has some
retirees who gain and some who lose, their net welfare implications depend on how those welfare
weights vary across the population of retirees.
4.1 Two familiar principles
The conventional approach to normative evaluation in much of applied public economics research
is to rely on well-known principles with roots in political philosophy, the two most commonly-used
being the simple-sum utilitarian criterion and the so-called "Rawlsian," or maximin criterion.16
16See Weinzierl (2014) for a critique of this conventional choice in the optimal tax literature.
21These two criteria have especially clear implications for the welfare weights gi;t, and it turns out
that the choice between them illustrates well the policymaking challenge that bene￿ts-indexing
reform presents.
Under the simple-sum utilitarian criterion, the change in welfare dW is the sum of the expe-
rienced annual utility changes across all individuals. In the language of the general formula (3)
above, this option sets gi;t = u0 (ci;t), so that society puts greater weight on the annual consump-
tion changes of individuals with lower consumption levels (and thus higher marginal utilities of
consumption). Figure 6 shows the gi;t for the same four deciles as in previous ￿gures, given the
consumption levels in the simulated Status Quo economy from the previous section and scaled so
that the maximum gi;t equals one.
































Figure 6: Marginal welfare weights gi;t for four of the ten deciles of retirees under the Utilitarian
criterion, where gi;t equals the marginal utility from consumption at age t for a retiree of type i.
The vertical axes in Figure 6 all have the same scale, making it clear that the utilitarian criterion
puts much greater weight on consumption changes for lower-income retirees than others, and in
particular on consumption changes at advanced ages for those households, when their consumption
22levels fall to the level of their Social Security bene￿ts. Note that these di⁄erences are especially
large given our assumption (following SSK) that ￿ = 3, a value that is toward the upper end of
conventional ranges for that parameter. If we use ￿ = 1:5, the marginal weights on the ￿fth decile
rise to around 0.20.
The Rawlsian criterion prioritizes the well-being of the worst-o⁄member of society. It therefore
sets gi;t = 1:00 on the consumption change of the household in the lowest income decile who lives
only one year in retirement￿ i.e., the household with the lowest overall utility in retirement￿ and
gi;t = 0:00 on all other consumption changes.17
The net welfare implications of each bene￿ts-indexing alternative under the Rawlsian criterion
are immediately apparent from examining Figure 5 for i = 1; t = 1, where we ￿nd the e⁄ects of each
path on the total utility in retirement for the household from decile 1 who dies in the ￿rst year of
retirement. From that ￿gure, it is clear that the Rawlsian criterion would endorse the Frontloaded
Reform over the Status Quo and both over the Backloaded Reform.
The net welfare implications under the utilitarian case are not so immediately clear, as that
criterion puts substantial weight not only on the same worst-o⁄ household that drove the Rawlsian
results but also on poor retirees who live long into retirement and spend down their private assets.
To calculate the change in social welfare under the utilitarian criterion, I multiply the relevant
git values by discounted consumption changes adjusted for survivorship and take the sum, as in
expression (3). The utilitarian criterion turns out to endorse the Backloaded Reform over the
Status Quo and both over the Frontloaded Reform: in other words, exactly the opposite order as
under the Rawlsian criterion.
As this result implies, the extent of backloading most preferred under the utilitarian criterion
may be substantially larger than that implied by a switch to the CPI-E. If we solve for the utilitarian-
optimal ￿ and ￿ (i.e., for the class of reforms formalized in expression 1), we ￿nd that ￿ = 0:012
(about three times the rate increase from the switch to the CPI-E) and ￿ = 0:91 maximize total
expected utility of all retirees at retirement (we cannot use the marginal welfare weights approach
in this case because the changes are too large).
The contrast between the Rawlsian and utilitarian rankings suggests that there may exist a
mixture of the two that would be consistent with the Status Quo policy being chosen as optimal.
In fact, if we put a weight of 0.91 on the Rawlsian weights and 0.09 on the utilitarian weights,
the planner prefers the Status Quo policy to both the backloaded and frontloaded reforms.18 The
large implied weight on the Rawlsian weights in the Status Quo makes sense in light of the ￿nding
that backloading is preferred by most agents. That is, for the Status Quo policy to be optimal the
17The Rawlsian priority as modeled here is an extreme case of a social objective in which weights on individuals
decrease in their lifetime, rather than annual, utility￿ see Pestieau and Ponthiere (2012) and the comments on this
paper by Aleh Tsyvinski for discussions. A related pattern for MSWWs (in this paper￿ s framework) weights con-
sumption changes by the retiree￿ s total utility in retirement raised to a negative exponent (e.g., as if we were taking
the marginal utility of total consumption in retirement). Such weights can generate a preference for frontloading
if the curvature over total retirement utility is steep enough, because the weights in that case approach Rawlsian
weights. For less steep curvature, backloading is still preferred.
18Thanks to Aleh Tsyvinski for suggesting this analysis.
23planner must have a large weight on the worst-o⁄ retiree.
The Hybrid Progressive Reform, however, is the most-preferred of these policies under both the
utilitarian and Rawlsian criteria. By combining the two other reforms￿positive implications for the
poorest retirees, the Hybrid Progressive Reform outperforms them both. That is, the frontloading
in the early years of the proposal bene￿ts the worst-o⁄ retirees, increasing its appeal under the
Rawlsian criterion, while the backloading through the bene￿t enhancements brings utilitarian gains.
Both of these bene￿ts are substantially augmented by the redistribution pursued under this reform,
while the corresponding negative e⁄ects on the top half of retirees are given, under both criteria, very
little weight. We can quantify the potential gain from this reform under the utilitarian criterion by
calculating the uniform proportional increase in consumption across all retiree types and ages that
would generate the same increase in social welfare as does this reform over the Status Quo. That
"consumption-equivalent" gain is 0.75 percent of consumption for retirees in the case of the Hybrid
Progressive Reform. For comparison, the Backloaded Reform generates a gain of 0.12 percent of
consumption for retirees, and the Frontloaded Reform generates a slightly smaller size loss. Recall
that all of these calculations abstract from a number of indirect e⁄ects of bene￿ts-indexing reform
on households, including on their labor supply and saving decisions during their working lives.
Of course, these conventional criteria may not match true social preferences, and to explore this
possibility we now turn to an attempt to empirically study society￿ s normative priorities for Social
Security.
4.2 Evidence on prevailing normative priorities for Social Security
This section presents some novel survey evidence on the American public￿ s priorities for Social
Security generated through Amazon￿ s Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) interface. The way in which this
survey elicits marginal social welfare weights gi;t may prove useful to other researchers interested
in using a positive approach to normative questions.19
The survey was completed in August, 2014 by 150 members of the Amazon Mechanical Turk
worker population from the United States who demonstrated good past performance on tasks.
Respondents had up to 15 minutes to complete the survey, and they were asked to enter their
M-Turk identi￿cation number as well as a completion code at the end of the survey for veri￿cation
purposes. The respondents completed the survey in less than seven minutes on average. They were
paid $2.50 for the task, for an average hourly rate of $23.00.
Mechanical Turk is of course an imperfect tool: e.g., it is not a representative sample of Amer-
icans. That said, it has proven to be a popular alternative to surveys costing orders of magnitude
more (with their own problems with representativeness), and analysis by subgroup can provide
some reassurance on the robustness of the results to sample composition. Horton, Rand, and Zeck-
hauser (2010) study the use of Mechanical Turk, and ￿nd: "Online experiments, we show, can be
19A growing literature in public economic theory has considered using positive evidence on prevailing normative
priorities, rather than exogenously speci￿ed normative criteria, to inform evaluations of policy. See Gaertner and
Schokkaert (2012) for an overview of "empirical social choice" research. Weinzierl (2014) and Saez and Stantcheva
(2014) are recent examples applied to tax policy.
24just as valid￿ both internally and externally￿ as laboratory and ￿eld experiments, while often
requiring far less money and time to design and conduct."
The survey has three parts. The ￿rst part tests whether respondents understand and can
perform simple calculations related to the concepts of percentages, averages, and life expectancy.
The third part of the survey asks respondents to self-report their political views and demographic
traits (age, gender, education, and economic status).
I gather data on normative priorities for Social Security in the second part of the survey.
Respondents are given a one-sentence (o¢ cial) description of Social Security, told that policymakers
must decide (among other things) how much in bene￿ts to pay out to di⁄erent retirees, and then
told they will be asked a couple of questions to get their "opinions on how policymakers should
make this choice." They are then shown the following screen:
The three retirees in this ￿rst question represent three important points in the joint age-income
distribution.20 In particular, John represents a very low income individual with a short life ex-
pectancy, the point given particular priority by the Rawlsian criterion. William is also very low
income but has lived a long life, giving him a greater overall utility level than John but leaving
him with a smaller current (according to the survey) level of consumption. Thus a Utilitarian
would allocate more to William, while a Rawlsian would allocate more to John. Finally, Robert is
a middle-income individual approaching his expected lifespan. He is much better o⁄ than either of
the other retirees and provides a simple way for us to gauge how quickly marginal welfare weights
decline with well-being.21
This ￿rst question is largely intended to get respondents to engage with the descriptions of
20These names were the most popular names, according to the Social Security Administration￿ s names database,
for boys born in 1949 and 1924.
21The consumption levels indicated in the survey implicitly include other transfers for John and WIlliam, such as
SSI and SNAP. See Section 5 for a discussion of how these programs relate to this paper￿ s analysis of Social Security.
25these retirees. Nevertheless, the responses may be of interest. William is rated ￿rst by 62% the
respondents, John by 29%, and Robert by 9%. The preference for William directly casts some
doubt on the possibility that a Rawlsian criterion will emerge from the survey evidence.
The key questions for this paper￿ s purposes comes next, when respondents are shown a series
of screens starting with one like the following, tailored according to which retiree the respondent
ranked last in the previous question. In this screen, the respondent ranked Robert last in that
question.
If the respondent chooses Robert over John in this question, he or she is reminded (by the computer)
that Robert was ranked last in the earlier question, and he or she is asked to make the choices
consistent. Then, the following choice appears:
If the respondent chooses John over Robert, he or she then faces the same choice but with the
increase for John at $50 and then $25. After that, or whenever the respondent chooses Robert
over John, he or she then faces a similar set of choices between bene￿ts increases for Robert and
William.
These series of questions are designed to allow the direct inference of marginal welfare weights.22
To see how, suppose a respondent ranks Robert last and (implicitly) assigns marginal value gRobert
22An earlier version of the survey used sliders to elicit the same information. Though preferable in many ways,
the slider interface appeared to confuse respondents, who often implicitly assigned lower weights to retirees they
preferred.
26to Robert￿ s consumption. Then, an $100 increase in Robert￿ s bene￿ts provides a bene￿t to the
respondent (acting as a policymaker) of 100gRobert. The respondent is then asked to choose between
this gain and alternative gains. Suppose the respondent chooses the $50 increase for William (but
not the $25 increase) over the $100 increase for Robert. Then, we can infer that 100gRobert >
25gWilliam and 100gRobert < 50gWilliam implying that gRobert=gWilliam 2 [0:25; 0:5]: Similarly, we
can calculate a range for gRobert=gJohn for each respondent, indicating the pro￿le of relative welfare
weights across these retirees.
Components of these questions are designed to counteract some potential confounding in￿ uences
on the respondents. I ask respondents to "ignore any e⁄ects these options might have on the rest
of the economy, and focus on the e⁄ect each option has on the corresponding retiree." This request
is intended in particular to minimize the extent to which respondents consider the e¢ ciency costs
of raising di⁄erent amounts of extra revenue for the bene￿ts increases. I also ask them to "imagine
that you are a policymaker" in the hopes that it will cause the respondents to take a considered,
objective perspective. Inconsistent answers across the ranking question and the series of choices
cause error messages to appear, preventing the respondent from making errors in interpreting the
questions. Finally, the wide range of potential relative valuations implied by the choices (from 1:3
to 4:0 in each case) is intended to reduce concerns that respondents would default to equality and
thereby imply smaller di⁄erences between g weights than is accurate, as might be natural in other
designs (such as splitting an amount between the retirees).
A number of potential risks remain with survey evidence of this kind. One risk is that respon-
dents may not be accustomed to thinking about these policy choices in terms of indi⁄erence points,
which seem natural to most economists but which reverse the intuitive idea that the respondent
would like to grant his or her preferred retirees greater increases, not smaller ones, than his or her
least preferred retiree. Of course, more general concerns about how the questions are framed and
whether the survey primes respondents toward any particular outcome also apply to this speci￿c
survey.
The results of the survey for the relative weight on Robert versus John and William are con-
sistent with those weights implied by the utilitarian criterion. The median choices across all re-
spondents imply a range of values for both gRobert=gWilliam and gRobert=gJohn of [0:00; 0:25]. That
is, these median responses indicate a very small value for the welfare weight on Robert relative to
both John and William, consistent with Figure 6 that shows a negligible weight on Robert under
the utilitarian criterion. Of course, it is possible that the true relative weight put on Robert lies
closer to 0.25 than to zero (which the survey cannot pin down). It is also possible that respondents
systematically took the mental shortcut provided by choosing that John or William receive an
increase￿ no matter how small￿ rather than Robert, which would bias our estimate of the relative
value of gRobert toward zero. Of the 116 respondents who ranked Robert last in the ￿rst question,
approximately three-quarters (85) chose the bene￿t increase for both John and William in all cases.
At the same time, the results of the survey for the relative weights on John and William are not
consistent with those implied by either the utilitarian criterion or the Rawlsian criterion on their
27own. Speci￿cally, the median choice across all respondents implies that gJohn=gWilliam = 1:00, so
that respondents put similar value on bene￿ts increases for John and William, contrary to the util-
itarian preference for William (which Figure 6 suggests would approximately set gJohn=gWilliam =
0:5) and the Rawlsian extreme preference for John. In fact, the mean choice among those who
ranked Robert last, which is in general too sensitive to outliers to be a useful measure of prefer-
ences in this survey, implies that gJohn=gWilliam = 1:05 with a standard error of 0:05 (the means
are very large for those who ranked William last and very small for those who ranked John last).
Both of these sets of results hold across virtually all subgroups. They hold for respondents
aged 18-25, 26-40, 41-64, and 65+; for both male and female respondents, and for respondents who
place themselves on the political left, middle, and right. The only exceptions are across race and
household incomes, where for (the small number of) black and high-income respondents the relative
weight on Robert is in the range [0:25; 0:5].
One possibility suggested by these results is that respondents￿moral reasoning re￿ ects a mixture
of these two standard criteria, Such a mix can easily generate gi;t values for t = 1 and t = 35 for
the lowest income decile i = 1 that are very similar, in keeping with the survey evidence on John
and William. The same mix yields extremely small values for the welfare weight on the "average"
retiree (i.e., i = 5 and T = 10), in keeping with the survey evidence on Robert.
When we apply these weights to the reform options, the rankings and consumption-equivalent
welfare gains and losses are the same for all reform proposals as under the utilitarian criterion.
The costs of the Backloaded Reform for the worst-o⁄ retirees are not enough to o⁄set the gains it
generates for the poor retirees who outlive their private assets, so backloaded bene￿ts as under a
switch to the CPI-E are preferred to frontloaded bene￿ts as under a switch to the chained CPI-U.
The Hybrid Progressive Reform, by combining the Backloaded Reform￿ s appeal to long-lived poor
retirees with the Frontloaded Reform￿ s appeal to the short-lived poor retirees, dominates the policy
ranking under this criterion, re￿ ecting survey respondents￿low concern for consumption decreases
among better-o⁄ retirees.
5 Extensions to the baseline analysis
In this section, I extend the analysis above along a number of dimensions. Though each extension
modi￿es the baseline results somewhat, the basic seesaw metaphor, the tradeo⁄between the e⁄ects
on the vast majority of retiree households and the worst-o⁄, and the likely net welfare impacts of
the direct e⁄ects of bene￿ts-indexing reform all continue to apply. To simplify the discussion, I
focus on the e⁄ects of these extensions on the Backloaded and Frontloaded Reform policies.
5.1 Myopic households
The fully rational, foresighted utility maximizing household modeled above may not represent all, or
even most, retirees￿consumption and saving behavior. In particular, though the evidence reviewed
in Section 1 suggests that myopia is not an issue for most retirees outside of the lowest income
28deciles, we might be interested in the e⁄ects of assuming that some share of retirees have di¢ culty
delaying consumption early in retirement. Feldstein (1985, 1987) made clear the importance of
myopic households to determining the optimal path of bene￿ts.
To gauge the e⁄ects of this myopia, I consider a model in which retirees from the bottom through
sixth income deciles choose consumption at each age using a lower discount factor ^ ￿ than the true
discount factor ￿ upon which their utility depends, as in Table 6:
Table 6: Impatience by income decile
Bottom 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top
^ ￿ 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
￿ 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
That is, individuals use ^ ￿ to choose their consumption paths, but the utilitarian evaluation of their
overall retirement utility uses ￿ (as would, it is assumed, the individuals if they were able to adopt
a disinterested perspective). Of course this is only a crude version of this extension to the baseline
model, for example a more sophisticated model would have heterogeneity in impatience within
deciles.
The results are similar to the baseline results, but more extreme. That is, the gains from Back-
loaded Reform are larger for the majority of households that value its insurance against longevity
risk￿ a feature even more bene￿cial in a setting where households have di¢ culty saving. For exam-
ple, households in the second decile (i = 2) who survive thirty years into retirement see a 30 percent
larger gain (in utility terms) from Backloaded Reform in this setting than in the baseline. At the
same time, the gains from frontloading are even higher for those retirees with short ex post lives
and few initial assets. For example, the shortest-lived household in the bottom decile has more than
twice the gain from frontloading in this setting as in the baseline. Moreover, the shorter-lived half
of households in the second income decile now gain from Frontloaded Reform (whereas they lost in
the baseline case), as their impatience causes them to bene￿t more from the higher initial bene￿ts
and their limited assets make the appeal of backloading small. Their (impatient) consumption of an
even higher share of the frontloaded bene￿ts means that, when they (ex post) do not survive later
into retirement, their realized utility during retirement was even higher than in the patient case.
On balance, under the utilitarian criterion the increase in the gains to the majority of households
outweighs the increase in the losses to a few, such that the net welfare impacts of the direct e⁄ects
on retirees are more positive for backloading and more negative for frontloading in this model than
in the baseline case. Similarly, the di⁄erence between the two policies under the Rawlsian criterion,
which ranks the frontloading policy ahead of the backloading policy, also grows.
5.2 Budget non-neutrality
Thus far I have imposed budget neutrality to disentangle the e⁄ects of changing the shape of the
time-path of bene￿ts from the e⁄ects of changing the expected present-value of those bene￿ts. Of
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choosing a more slowly-growing price index, such as the chained CPI-U, would generate savings for
the Social Security program.
The approach taken above can readily include a requirement that reform lower the expected
present-value cost of bene￿ts. To illustrate this, I reduce all Status Quo bene￿ts by 10 percent and
impose the same restriction on reform policies as before, namely that they have the same expected
present value total cost of bene￿ts. The baseline results change very little with this variation, with
the same households lining up on either end of the seesaw as in the baseline case and the same
net welfare implications obtaining. The intuition for these results is that the relative e⁄ects of the
reforms are largely una⁄ected by the shift in their total value. Once all are adjusted to provide
10 percent smaller total bene￿ts, the backloaded reform continues to provide better longevity risk
protection than the modi￿ed Status Quo or frontloaded reform, while the poorest, shortest-lived
retirees continue to prefer the frontloaded reform that provides greater bene￿ts early on. These
results support the argument that analyses of the level and shape of bene￿ts may be done separately.
5.3 Non-constant Status Quo bene￿ts
Second, thus far I have assumed that Status Quo bene￿ts are constant in real terms. In reality, there
is considerable debate and uncertainty over whether they are increasing or decreasing in real terms.
Goda et al. (2007) argue that current bene￿ts-indexing, and even the faster-growing CPI-E, fail to
provide enough protection against the rising costs of medical expenditure among retirees as they age
and over time. Speci￿cally, they calculate the real Social Security bene￿t net of medical expenses
and show that it grew more slowly from 1983 to 2007 than did a price index of non-medical goods and
services (so the real non-medical purchasing power of Social Security bene￿ciaries declined). On the
other hand, ￿xed-basket price indices such as the CPI-W are susceptible to the well-known problem
that they overestimate the in￿ ation faced by individuals due to quality changes and substitution
away from expensive goods and services (see Boskin et al, 1996).
To test the sensitivity of our baseline results to this assumption, I consider two alternatives.
First, to study the possibility that the CPI-W underestimates the in￿ ation faced by retirees, I
assume that the CPI-E is, in fact, the correct price index for retirees. This means that Backloaded
Reform now has ￿ = 0:00, and I set its ￿ = 1:00 to impose budget neutrality as in the baseline case.
The Status Quo now has ￿ = ￿0:0037 and ￿ = 1:031, while Frontloaded Reform has ￿ = ￿0:0064
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Figure 7: Annual bene￿ts paths under Status Quo (solid line), Backloaded Reform (dashed line),
Frontloaded Reform (dotted line), and V-shaped Reform (dash-dot line), in thousands of real
2005 dollars, for four of ten household lifetime-income deciles, when the Backloaded Reform is
the one that provides a constant real bene￿t.
Though the bene￿ts paths in Figure 7 look quite di⁄erent from those in Figure 3, the relative
e⁄ects of reform on households are remarkably similar in this variation on the baseline analysis.
Essentially the same households bene￿t from Backloaded Reform and Frontloaded Reform, and to
very similar degrees. The results on the net welfare implications of reform are very similar, as well,
under either the utilitarian or Rawlsian criterion.
Second, to study the possibility that the CPI-W overestimates the in￿ ation faced by retirees,
I assume that the chained CPI-U is, in fact, the correct price index for retirees. This means that
Frontloaded Reform now has ￿ = 0:00, and I set its ￿ = 1:00, the Status Quo now has ￿ = +0:0027
and ￿ = 0:978, while Backloaded Reform has ￿ = +0:0064 and ￿ = 0:947. The baseline results are
robust to this variation, as well.
315.4 Bequest motive
The retirees in the baseline model have no reason to retain wealth other than longevity risk. In
much of the existing literature explaining retiree wealth dynamics, a bequest motive is used as an
ingredient to explain the retention of substantial assets late into retirement. As noted earlier, the
simulations in this paper generate paths for what Love et al. (2008) call "annualized comprehensive
wealth," that ￿t well with what appears in the data. Nevertheless, it may be valuable to understand
the robustness of our results to the existence of a bequest motive, given its prominence in previous,
more sophisticated, simulations of retiree behavior.
To test this, I have households value any assets left at death as if those assets were consumed by
their heirs in the next period, multiplied by a factor scaling the strength of their bequest motive,
using the same utility function speci￿cation (4) as for the household while it was alive. That
parameter, ￿ is:
Table 7: Bequest motive by income decile
Bottom 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top
￿ 1 1 1 1 1 10 20 30 40 50
such that the top deciles have a relatively strong bequest motive. The resulting simulation has,
as would be expected, no households die with zero assets (whereas in the baseline simulation 19
percent of households die with zero assets. This likely overstates the degree of bequeathing done
at the bottom of the income distribution and understates it at the top. Nevertheless, the results
are informative in that the changes from the baseline simulation are quite minor outside of the
pattern of asset holdings. That is, the top decile retirees now die with assets equal to about three
times their consumption late in retirement. The sets of households who gain and lose from each
reform are largely the same as in the baseline analysis, as is the ranking of policies under either
the utilitarian or Rawlsian criteria. One minor but interesting di⁄erence from the baseline is that
high-decile retirees raise their consumption less later in life under the backloading reform than in
the baseline case. Intuitively, with a bequest motive these retirees save more of their private assets
until death.
Of course, the non-surviving household leaves assets unspent in the Frontloaded policy, and if
those assets were reclaimed by the government, the di⁄erence between the policies would diminish.
In reality, the U.S. government raises very little revenue from the taxation of bequests, and none
from households for which Social Security bene￿ts materially change their accumulation of assets, so
I assume that the direct ￿scal costs of bene￿ts is not o⁄set by any posthumous taxation. Similarly,
I do not consider the value inheritors place on bequests, a topic analyzed in Feldstein (1990), to
retain this paper￿ s focus on the direct e⁄ects of reform on retirees.
5.5 Additional transfers
Throughout the analysis I abstract from additional transfers made to poor retirees. In reality, the
very poor elderly receive support from the Supplementary Security Income program as well as more
32targeted programs such as in-kind "food stamps" through the SNAP program. The baseline SSI
transfer was approximately $10,000 per year for an elderly couple and $7,000 for an individual in
2005, according to the Social Security Administration. SSI bene￿ts are displaced dollar-for-dollar
by almost any income source, including Social Security bene￿ts.
While including these transfers in the simulations above is technically straightforward, there are
conceptual complications. In particular, in reality these transfers are indexed for in￿ ation just as
are Social Security bene￿ts. If we include these transfers without adjusting their indexing approach￿
something the President￿ s 2014 budget proposal suggested￿ changes to the Social Security bene￿ts
of the lowest-decile retirees are entirely canceled out by changes to their SSI bene￿ts (though the
government would save some money that could be allocated to other retirees). This mechanically
neutralizes the bene￿ts of Frontloaded reform. In fact, in simulations of the baseline model modi￿ed
to include a guaranteed minimum bene￿t of $9,000 that falls dollar-for-dollar with Social Security
bene￿t increases, the lowest-decile households are una⁄ected by any indexing reform, most other
households lose from the Frontloaded Reform, and all other households gain from Backloaded
Reform. That is, the Backloaded Reform can produce a Pareto improvement in this case relative
to the Status Quo. Another, simpler scenario is that such transfers would also be adjusted in any
reform to bene￿ts-indexing, so that the net e⁄ect on bene￿ciaries of a reform to Social Security
bene￿ts-indexing may be only partially o⁄set, not o⁄set at all, or even magni￿ed. Because of
this ambiguity, and the likelihood that including such transfer programs in the analysis would
strengthen the results of the baseline, I chose to omit them from the main paper. Of course a more
comprehensive analysis that included a range of potential changes to these transfer programs would
be valuable.
Finally, note that our omission of these transfers causes the marginal utility values of consump-
tion for individuals in the lowest income decile to be larger than if these transfers were included.
This factor will cause the baseline analysis to overestimate the appeal of frontloaded reform and
underestimate the appeal of backloaded reform.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The choice of a price index for Social Security bene￿ts may seem to have, for most purposes, small
stakes. One exception, however, is its implications for retirees who rely on Social Security bene￿ts to
fund their consumption either because their own resources are limited or they outlive their expected
lifespan. For these retirees, half of a percentage point faster growth in bene￿ts￿ approximately the
di⁄erence between two of the most prominent proposals for indexing reform￿ turns into a 20 percent
increase in bene￿ts if they outlive their private savings. On the other hand, assuming budget-neutral
reform, it also can mean bene￿ts that are 7 percent lower at the start of retirement, when they are
sure to be alive to receive them.
In this paper, I outline a ￿ exible and relatively simple formal structure for modeling this tradeo⁄
in the direct e⁄ects of bene￿ts-indexing reform on a population of heterogeneous retiree households.
33I bring to that model evidence from recent empirical work on Social Security, quantifying the
e⁄ects of three prominent policy proposals. I gather some new evidence on the priorities Americans
appear to have for Social Security bene￿ts, using a methodology that may prove useful more
broadly. Finally, using that evidence, as well as conventional normative criteria, I provide suggestive
estimates of those proposals￿e⁄ects in terms of social welfare.
The results of this analysis suggest that reform to a backloaded bene￿ts-indexing approach,
such as the CPI-E, has substantial appeal, at least in terms of its direct e⁄ects on retirees. Note
that this is, of course, the opposite proposal to the one that has generated the most enthusiasm
in Washington: namely, a switch to the slower-growing chained CPI-U. A backloaded approach￿ s
ability to concentrate resources at later ages, when retirees face longevity risk and have exhausted
their own resources, makes it the preferred approach for most retirees. While a normative criterion
that concentrates priority on the worst-o⁄ retirees would therefore endorse a frontloaded reform,
the standard utilitarian criterion and the criterion implied by the survey evidence in this paper
prefer to backload the path of bene￿ts.
Political considerations make the case for backloaded bene￿ts-indexing reform extremely di¢ -
cult, however. Such a reform would require a reduction in initial bene￿ts to retain budget neutrality
or an increase in total spending on bene￿ts to retain initial bene￿t levels. Both requirements are
likely to be deal-killers in Washington.
In this context, the appeal of President Obama￿ s 2014 budget proposal for a bene￿ts-indexing
reform that combines a shift to the chained CPI-U with bene￿t enhancements at advanced ages
becomes clear. Such a proposal can capture the best parts of both of the simpler reforms￿ protecting
both the poorest, shortest-lived retirees who would prefer frontloading and the large majority of
retirees, especially those who live to advanced ages, who prefer backloading. It is important to
note that the President￿ s speci￿c proposal combined this hybrid of frontloading and backloading
with an increase in progressivity, which might be achieved through other means, as the bene￿t
enhancements at advanced ages were to be uniform across the lifetime-income distribution. In the
simulations above it causes the top ￿ve income deciles of retirees to prefer the Status Quo to this
reform, and the potential disincentive e⁄ects from which this paper abstracts may therefore reduce
this proposal￿ s appeal. Nevertheless, if those disincentive e⁄ects are limited and the normative
preferences of Americans resemble those of either the conventional utilitarian criterion or those
implied by the survey results in this paper, the Hybrid Progressive Reform is likely to generate￿ in
terms of the direct e⁄ects on retirees￿ a sizeable net welfare gain.
As this result and the rest of the analysis in this paper has demonstrated, bene￿ts-indexing
reform is more than just a ￿scal issue; its distributional implications and its possible role as a
vehicle for redistribution make it a ￿ exible and potentially powerful policy tool. Given that, it is
important to reiterate that this paper uses a simpli￿ed model that abstracts from a number of e⁄ects
of shifting the time-path of bene￿ts on household behavior and the general economic environment,
as well as from complexities of the Social Security system and retiree household structure. My hope
is that it puts that simplicity to good use, clarifying a piece of the tradeo⁄s involved in choosing a
34method of bene￿ts-indexing, and that further analyses will re￿ne our understanding of the lessons
learned here.
35References
[1] Boskin, Michael J., E. Dulberger, R. Gordon, Z. Griliches, and D. Jorgenson (1996). ￿Toward a
More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living," Final Report to the Senate Finance Committee,
December 4
[2] Bosworth, Barry and Kathleen Burke (2013). "Di⁄erential Mortality and Retirement Bene￿ts
in the Health and Retirement Study," Brookings.
[3] Burdick, Clark and Lynn Fisher (2007), "Social Security Cost-of-Living Adjustments and the
Consumer Price Index," Social Security Bulletin, 67(3).
[4] Butrica, Barbara A., Joshua H. Goldwyn, and Richard W. Johnson (2005). "Understanding
Expenditure Patterns in Retirement," Center for Retirement Research at Boston College WP
2005-03, January.
[5] Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (2013). "The President￿ s Proposed Chained CPI
Protections." Accessed at http://crfb.org/blogs/presidents-proposed-chained-cpi-protections,
August 2014.
[6] Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2006). "Is Social Security Progressive?" December 15, 2006.
[7] Duggan, James E., Robert Gillingham, and John Greenlees (2007), "Mortality and Lifetime
Income: Evidence from Social Security Records," Working paper.
[8] Englehardt, Gary V. and Jonathan Gruber (2004), "Social Security and the Evolution of
Elderly Poverty," NBER WP 10466.
[9] Feldstein, Martin (1976), "On the Theory of Tax Reform," Journal of Public Economics, 6,
77-104.
[10] Feldstein, Martin (1985), "The Optimal Level of Social Security Bene￿ts," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 50(2).
[11] Feldstein, Martin (1987), "Should Social Security Bene￿ts Increase with Age?" NBER Working
Paper 2200.
[12] Feldstein, Martin (1990), "Imperfect Annuitiy Markets, Unintended Bequests, and the Optimal
Age Structure of Social Security Bene￿ts." Journal of Public Economics 41(4), pp. 31-43.
[13] Gaertner, Wulf and Erik Schokkaert (2012). Empirical Social Choice: Questionnaire-
Experimental Studies on Distributive Justice. Cambridge.
[14] Gale, William G., John Karl Scholz, and Ananth Seshadri (2009). "Are All Americans Saving
￿ Optimally￿for Retirement?".
36[15] Goda, Gopi Shah, John B. Shoven, and Sita Natari Slavov (2009). "Di⁄erential Mortality by
Income and Social Security Progressivity," Working Paper.
[16] Guesnerie, R (1977), "On the Direction of Tax Reform," Journal of Public Economics, 7,
179-202.
[17] Horton, John J., David G. Rand, and Richard J. Zeckhauser, "The Online Laboratory: Conducting
Experiments in a Real Labor Market," Experimental Economics.
[18] Hurd, Michael D. and Susann Rohwedder, (2008), "The Adequacy of Economic Resources in
Retirement," Michigan WP 2008-184.
[19] Krugman, Paul (2012). "Life, Death, and De￿cits," New York Times, November 15.
[20] Liebman, Je⁄rey B.; Erzo F.P. Luttmer; and David G. Seif, (2009). "Labor supply responses to
marginal Social Security bene￿ts : Evidence from discontinuities." Journal of Public Economics
93, pp. 1208-1223.
[21] Love, David A., Michael G. Palumbo, and Paul A. Smith, (2009) "The trajectory of wealth in
retirement," Journal of Public Economics.
[22] Olsen, Anya (2008). "Distributional E⁄ects of Reducing the Cost-of-Living Adjustments,"
Social Security Administration Policy Brief No 2008-03, November.
[23] Penner, Rudolph G. and Karen E. Smith, (2010). "How Quickly Do Older Adults Spend Their
Wealth? Urban Institute.
[24] Pestieau, Pierre and Gregory Ponthiere, (2012), "The Public Economics of Increasing
Longevity," Hacienda Public Espanola/Revista de Economia Publica 200, pp. 35-68.
[25] Saez, Emmanuel and Stefanie Stantcheva (2014). "Generalized Social Marginal Welfare
Weights for Optimal Tax Theory." Available as NBER working paper 18835.
[26] Scholz, John Karl, Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun, (2006), "Are Americans Saving
￿Optimally￿for Retirement?" Journal of Political Economy
[27] Shiller, Robert J. (2003). The New Financial Order. Princeton.
[28] Smith, Karen E. and Melissa M. Favreault (2013), "A Primer on Modeling Income in the Near
Term, Version 7 (MINT7)," Urban Institute, Washington D.C., October.
[29] Smith, Karen, Mauricio Soto, and Rudolph G. Penner (2009). "How Seniors change their Asset
Holdings during Retirement," Center for Retirement Research at Boston College WP 2009-31
Released: December 2009.
[30] Waldron, Hilary, (2007), "Trends in Mortality Di⁄erentials and Life Expectancy for Male Social
Security￿ Covered Workers, by Socioeconomic Status," Social Security Bulletin, 67(3).
37[31] Weinzierl, Matthew (2014). "The Promise of Positive Optimal Taxation," Journal of Public
Economics.
[32] White House (2010). The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, Decem-
ber.
38